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Lately it has become an article of faith that the passage from the current "Army of Excellence" to the "Army After
Next" of 2025 will not occur unless all three components--the Active Army component (AC), Army National Guard
(ARNG), and Army Reserve (USAR)--arrive together as an integrated force.[1] Yet while guidepost-concepts like
"seamless Army" and "total force" capture our best intentions, it remains uncertain if such high hopes will become
reality. Embedded mistrust among the three components, for example, is likely to resurface and impede future
initiatives as Army budgets decline.[2] Nevertheless, the wisdom for transitioning into the 21st century as an integrated
team is self-evident, making it imperative to find sensible ways to achieve that. This article takes up the challenge by
examining two general areas. The first section examines a prevailing attitudinal belief-system, herein labeled the
"pyramid mentality," which is undermining trust relationships between the AC and Reserve Components (RC) and will
continue to do so if not corrected. The second section examines six ongoing pilot programs designed to bring the
Active, Guard, and Reserve closer together and then explores them further for better routes toward a "seamless Army"
by the year 2025.
Tilting the Pyramid
First, here is an oft-stated but poorly applied truism: The Army National Guard is not the Army Reserve, nor viceversa, and neither is like the Active Army. On the surface, the differences seem apparent. In reality, the distinctions,
particularly between the Reserve Components, are deeply complicated and, to a surprising extent, poorly understood
by leaders from all three components. The oversight has led to mistakes in operational thinking and unwarranted
condescension in the transition to a "seamless Army." More commonly, observers understand that regulars work fulltime, train an average of 240 days a year, socially cocoon themselves on military posts, and make up less than half the
Army force. Guard and Reserve members work part-time, two days a month, train for an average of 39 days a year, are
socially rooted in civilian communities where they hold civilian jobs, and command over 54 percent of the total Army
force.[3]
Less obvious is how each component's unique characteristics have been applied to undermine trust relationships
among them, thus spoiling a unified approach to "seamlessness." Perhaps the best way to grasp the differences is to
recognize the reality that each component is defining its role (and place) in the Total Force based on its perceived
position within the tri-institutional hierarchy, a formulation noted here as the "pyramid mentality." More than just
describing a "food chain" survival relationship, the pyramid mentality outlines a belief system that undergirds attitudes
which, in turn, affect (positively or negatively) interdependent relationships.
Fundamentally, the pyramid thesis posits that the way in which all three components think and act when dealing with
each other is in hierarchical terms, a paradigm injurious to all. Two such pyramids are undermining the transition to
the Army After Next (AAN), as shown in Figure 1, below.

Figure 1. Relevant Readiness and Relevant Power Pyramids.

In the first version, "relevant readiness" is prized above all else. Being "most combat ready" with the "most relevant
force" to fight and win the nation's wars or meet its pressing security needs is the essence of the "relevant readiness"
pyramid. In the second version, "relevant power" is what is most important. Here relevant power refers to the inherent
political power wielded by each institution to influence decisionmaking and to get its way. Relevant political power is
perceived among the three components as crucial in terms of how progress (or regress) is ultimately determined.
The pyramid mentality is a nuanced version of an old affliction. A mix of history and law has formed within the Army
a sort of psychological hierarchy with the notion of preparedness as the Army's raison d'être. Not surprisingly, then, the
AC sits atop the "relevant readiness" pyramid. This is because regulars are widely accepted as the preeminent
professionals responsible for scripting warfighting doctrine and are the first to act when a military crisis arises.
Because of the AC's full-time status and first-to-fight responsibility, it has always been the most combat-ready and
thus able to claim the top position.[4] The concomitant authority has also enabled the AC to define for the reserves the
standards for being "prepared." Or as expressed in today's vernacular, the AC's job is to show the reserves "what `right'
looks like." Historical examples for such a high-minded outlook are abundant, dating back to the American Revolution
and coming to full force with the post-Civil War writings of Emory Upton.[5] For the post-Cold War era, the AC's
standard for "relevant readiness" has come to be defined as an immediacy for deployment readiness, an immediacy for
returning back to top form after redeployment, and an immediacy for keeping up with an unforgiving peacetime
training pace.[6] Translated into an attitudinal belief system, anyone--or any unit--failing to measure up to these
standards is thought to be less than fully prepared and thus less than fully worthy.
Under such an institutional definition of self-worth, it becomes clear how the USAR would be seated in the second tier
and the ARNG at the bottom. As a federal force, the USAR is the most "accessible" to the Active Army to meet
immediate "relevant readiness" requirements. By mutual agreement, the USAR was purposely structured to perform
the AC's combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) missions, enabling the regulars maximum latitude to
fulfill their combat arms role and the USAR maximum participation as a ready and relevant force.[7] Indeed, "Ready
and Relevant!"--the clarion call of the USAR--is borne out by its deployability record, where reservists have
shouldered the greatest load. Over 70 percent of all RC forces participating in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti
(1995-96), for example, were USAR soldiers, and almost the same percentage is holding true for the 17,000 reservists
sent to Bosnia since 1995 for Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard.[8] If the AC has been characterized as the
"good servant"[9] for its apolitical, professional culture, than the USAR can be viewed by the tri-army as the "good
partner" for its "accessible" culture and institutional willingness to be relevant to the Total Force.
For just the opposite reasons, the Army National Guard is at the bottom of the "relevant readiness" pyramid. Because
of the Guard's Constitutional link to the individual states, it is practically inaccessible to the Active Army to meet
immediate deployment requirements. Nor does the ARNG's force structure dovetail with the Total Force's needs.
Indeed, because the Guard owns 58 percent of the Total Force's combat forces,[10] it is perceived by the AC and
USAR as a twofold impediment: first, for being less combat ready precisely because it possesses the largest percentage
of combat forces (the toughest arm to keep ready); and second, for being less relevant in the overall force structure

because of its incompatibility with the Total Force's needs as outlined in the two major contingency strategy. Here,
too, the Guard's deployment record bears out the charge. Until "Charlie" Company of the Virginia National Guard's 3d
battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment (Light), 29th Infantry Division, deployed to Bosnia in September 1997, no Army
National Guard infantry unit had deployed for a real-world mission since Vietnam.[11]
But the entire rating scheme is turned on its head when "relevant power" is considered. The Army National Guard
wields the greatest amount of political power of the three components to influence the overall transition effort to AAN.
In part, because of its dual-Constitutional responsibilities to serve both state and federal governments, the Guard is
uniquely positioned to maximize the political powers of the respective state governors as well as its own national
institutions. The Guard has its own formidable registered lobby group in the form of the National Guard Association
of the United States (NGAUS), a powerful voice on Capitol Hill.[12] The NGAUS is, in turn, fortified further by the
unity among the 50 state and four territorial Adjutant Generals (TAGs), the senior-ranking ARNG officer of each state,
who cooperatively coalesce their state connections through their own potent association, the Adjutants General
Association (AGAUS).[13] As Lieutenant Colonel Clemson Turregano made clear in his recent comparative study of
the tri-component power relationships, "The AGAUS Executive Secretary can readily access all 54 TAGs if there is an
important matter that needs attention . . . . [Thus] a critical message can be sent from Washington to the state TAG; the
TAG can talk with the governor, and a [coordinated] response can be back to lawmakers or critical decision makers
possibly within hours."[14] Indeed, not until 1903 did the National Guard change from being under state control in
time of peace and dual control in time of war to dual control in time of peace and national control in time of war.[15]
It makes a difference, too, that the ARNG members take an oath to their state constitutions secondary to their oath to
the United States Constitution.[16] Some regulars will be surprised to know that in South Carolina, for instance, the
post of the Adjutant General is an elected position. Thus the process for an officer to become the TAG in South
Carolina is akin to that of a civilian candidate running to become a governor or state senator. Such politico-military
duality affords the Guard the ability to translate (deftly) institutional concerns into "local" concerns and vice versa
without being judged by the same apolitical "good servant" standard as the AC.
Aside from its Constitutional foundation, there is another aspect to the Guard's relative power which is ennobling and
unmatched by the other two federal components. None of the aforementioned institutional politico-military ties matter
as much to average Americans as the ties that the ARNG has to them personally. For every local emergency, it is the
Guard which they see first and most prominently. Whether the circumstance is a hurricane in the Carolinas or Gulf
states, fires in Florida or California, floods across the Midwest, or tank displays for school fairs and community
parades, it is the Army National Guard which is tangibly serving the people's needs, led by local leaders, commanded
by state governors. Herein lies the Guardsmen's most potent power, stretching back three centuries before towns
became colonies and ultimately a nation: their indestructible "connectedness" to the people; where all power in
America is derived and translated by the power of the vote. To the average American at the community level across the
country, it is the Guardsman who represents for them "the good soldier."[17]
For all the reasons described, one can see how no single explanation can easily account for the confusion among the
three components' separate roles. Any attempt to generalize, too, is extremely difficult as the AC, ARNG, and USAR
are complex cultures on their own, legally, politically, and historically. But having already conceded much to their
points of distinctions, some generalizations can be made and are necessary to correct the "pyramid mentality."
One generalization is the perception among regulars that the RC have failed to keep quality soldiers, particularly
officers, in their forces--at least not enough quality, that is, to warrant automatic trust as equals.[18] This belief goes
beyond disparities in collective training skills, which all regulars recognize as a consequence of operating "part-time"
and under steep budget shortfalls. Indeed, such a view has existed for some time and should come as no surprise. In
part, the origins for this generalized perception can be traced to the outdated notion of the "expansible army," first
conceived in 1820 by then-Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, which did not stress quality in the reserves and is only
now being corrected.[19] The expansible army strategy held that in peacetime the nation would only pay for a small
but well-trained standing army while maintaining a large pool of less-than-fully-trained militia in the event of war.
Over time, the practice of maintaining a "large pool" came to mean using slack standards for retaining poor quality.
Indeed, not until 1996 did the reserves change their standards for promotion from "fully qualified," a euphemism for
"minimum acceptable" based on variable standards, to "best qualified," a standard mirroring the Active

Component's.[20] Loopholes in the Guard's promotion system, meanwhile, still exist, and thus its overall personnel
quality will be called into question.[21]
One consequence of such a perception from the reserves' perspective, particularly that of the USAR, has been to
overreach their capabilities to "prove" their worth.[22] Consider the case of the AC/RC force structure of the 4th
Infantry Division (Ft. Hood, Texas), the Army's first FORCE XXI division. As planned, some 417 slots (of 15,719) are
earmarked for the Reserve Components (ARNG, 162; USAR, 255).[23] These slots are to be filled primarily with
drilling reservists from the local area, that is, with citizen-soldiers who possess the right military occupational skills
(MOS), are trained (MOSQ), and who live within a "reasonable commuting distance," defined as within a 50-mile
radius. But even as the plan was publicly unveiled, the 50-mile distance had to be extended out to 100 miles.[24] More
troubling, the plan calls for more than two dozen technical MOSs and officer branches that presumably must be filled
by MOSQ soldiers. But getting soldiers trained in their MOS is an uphill challenge under the best of conditions for the
RC, never mind trying to locate 417 varied, MOS-trained, drilling reservists within a 100-mile radius of Killeen,
Texas.[25]
The allocation of RC billets will also make it tougher for the RC to overcome complicated personnel challenges.
Virtually all of the 417 billets are for individuals rather than units. Of these, most of the officer and NCO positions are
earmarked for the Guard, positions that are relatively easy to fill. This means that the USAR must bear the heavier
burden of securing fresh recruits or reassigning E4-level soldiers from local units to the 4th Infantry Division. If
current plans hold, as an example, the USAR will have to provide over 100 medics (MOS 91B), almost all them at the
E4 rank. Another pressing problem is the fact that these reservists will serve as individuals and not as an RC
warfighting unit under its own leadership or its own (particular) pay and promotion support system. Even if the longterm effect on culture-exchange is viewed as a greater good, the lost opportunity to develop "go-to-war" RC units
must be recognized as a calculated tradeoff. Moreover, while the ARNG managed to get three organized units into the
4th Infantry Division, adding an additional 90 or so more Guardsmen to the total, the Guard, too, will have a tough
challenge filling its 162 individual billets. At the time of this writing, the Texas Guard was troubled over FORCE XXI
billet commitments that might "break" existing Guard units whose soldiers were to be transferred to the 4th Infantry
Division.
These challenges are but the tip of the iceberg. The fast-paced, high-stress "operating tempo" (OPTEMPO) common to
active divisions will almost certainly press reservists to train beyond their normal 39 days. Even if that annual training
were increased to 60 days, as the USAR is planning, the increase is almost certain to have adverse effects upon
reservists' civilian employment.[26] Keep in mind, too, that these 39-60 days cannot now come in the normal weekend
installments of two to five days a month, but rather in blocks of two to three weeks over various periods to meet fieldtraining patterns. Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Charles Cragin is already wary that the unpredictability and
repetitiveness of overseas deployments--never mind the added "routine" stress of serving in a FORCE XXI division-is weakening the "tensile strength" between reservists and their civilian employers.[27]
Another generalization can also be made about the way the three organizations have conceived "reserve duty." From its
origins, Americans have joined the Guard and Reserve with the understanding that they were volunteering to serve
part-time in a force whose object was to prepare them to fight the nation's next war or to meet national emergencies
when called up. In keeping with that understanding, the RC set up a routinized, predictable training pattern of one
weekend a month and two weeks of active training a year. Individual expectations of serving part-time were not the
only calculations to be affected by such an understanding. For their part, the AC designed mobilization war plans to
conform to a World War III scenario. But when all this abruptly changed after the end of the Cold War in 1989,
neither the preconceived expectations nor war plans have been adequately addressed to keep pace to the phenomenon
known as "operations other than war" (OOTW), an umbrella term that, by definition, does not fit the World War III
mold. The change in the nature of war represented by OOTW has upset the conventional understanding of "reserve
duty."[28]
This conceptual flaw can be seen in the mobilization strategies governing reserve components that have not kept pace
with the realities of conflict in the post-Cold War era. The Army has routinely sent thousands of reservists in virtually
every peacekeeping or peacemaking mission, most for upwards of six months per deployment. With the possible
exception of the Gulf War, none of these deployments has fit the tacit understanding of fighting a World War III. Nor

have these "peace" operations measured up to the national-emergency standard. Yet the governing mobilization
strategy for the Guard and Reserve, known as FORMDEPS, has equated OOTW to World War III, and the RC to the
AC.[29]
When AC units are alerted for an operation, for example, they are expected to step up their preparations for the
eventual deployment. But for the Guard and Reserve, alert notification does not equal mobilization orders. Alert
notifications bring no automatic increase in training days to prepare, as is the case with the AC. Instead, reservists
must remain on a part-time basis until they receive mobilization orders that automatically place them on active duty.
Meanwhile, extra training days must be allotted by exception, funds allowing, such as putting reservists on extended
duty, or "AT," or "active duty special work" status. Nor do civilian bosses liken alert status to being called out on an
official mobilization order, which leaves reservists in a lurch to ask for time off.[30] To complicate matters further,
unless the President issues a "Stop Loss" order as part of the "President's selective reserve call-up," or PSRC,
reservists are not completely mandated to deploy. In short, reservists can--and have--opted out. These and similar
obstacles interfere with home-station preparedness, such as screening soldiers for dental problems that might prevent
deployment.[31]
When mobilization orders are finally issued and reservists are placed on full-time status--a point at which civilian
employers are traditionally expected to release them[32]--RC units find that FORMDEPS requirements provide for
only three days to finalize home-station preparations and to get to their mobilization station, generally miles away at
an AC post like Ft. Benning, Georgia. Thus much of the alert preparation is done "part-time." For many Reserve units,
too, it is only when they arrive at the AC mobilization site that the hard process begins of measuring combat readiness,
identifying shortfalls, and training them up to standards. The experience has left some reservists demoralized and
embittered and the regulars spiteful and untrusting. Meanwhile, the standard expectation among reservists remains
founded on a routinized training pattern of "two days a month and two weeks a year." In the minds of many
Guardsmen and Reservists, this is all that should rightfully be asked of them until a World War III or a legitimate
national emergency occurs or unless the rules are adapted to the nature of war in the post-Cold War era.
The final generalization is that senior Guard leaders will almost certainly refuse to accept that the "relevant readiness"
mindset applies to them. We can anticipate at least two reasons to account for their rejections. The first rationalization
is that any decrement of their total force structure, consisting primarily of 15 enhanced Separate Brigades (eBde) and
eight divisions, will be perceived as a decrement in their "relevant power."[33] Thus despite the fact that none of the
Guard's eight combat divisions figures into the existing war plans as outlined in the 1996 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR), both the National Guard Bureau and NGAUS are nonetheless adamant that they not only maintain their
existing structure but also receive the requisite budget to keep it "ready."[34] Indeed, when the QDR directed that the
ARNG pare its "over-structure" in an effort to stabilize the Total Force, the Guard flexed its "relevant power" and
forced General Reimer to forestall most of the proposed cuts.[35]
The second explanation is that the Guard mistrusts the AC to render an honest assessment of Guard readiness or to
keep to its word that, in war, the Guard will fight alongside the AC. Bitter memories over its treatment during Desert
Storm have not abated. The experience of the 48th Brigade, Georgia National Guard, is a case in point. Despite having
successfully passed a National Training Center (NTC) rotation the year before Desert Storm, the 48th Brigade returned
to the NTC for "brush up" training only to undergo grueling train-up standards that caused the brigade to miss the war
altogether. Indeed, none of the three enhanced Guard maneuver brigades that were called up made it to the war.
Whether the AC purposely raised the standards for readiness, as the Guard claimed, or whether the increased standards
were themselves a consequence of a heightened concern under wartime conditions is not at issue in this essay.[36] The
point here is that the Guard believed then that the AC broke a solemn trust. If the open venting against the AC at the
1998 NGAUS gathering in Wisconsin is any indication, moreover, the Guard has neither forgotten nor forgiven the
active force.[37]
Such resentment makes any attempt by the AC to inspect the Guard's readiness somewhat problematic. Thus where the
ARNG is quite open to ask the AC for assistance and expert advice to improve readiness, it resists such assistance if it
senses anything like an inspection of Guard readiness. It's no surprise, then, that in the buildup of the new AC/ARNG
division, the AC's "training readiness oversight" responsibility, or "TRO," has been among the thorniest issues to iron
out. In an arrangement that seems to force the AC into a corner, the preponderant portion of Active Army billets will

remain (or be confined, depending on your perspective) on AC posts, including both AC major general division
commanders, and roughly 200 billets each at Ft. Riley, Kansas, and Ft. Carson, Colorado. Meanwhile, only a small
forward staff of about 20 from each post will be sited near where the Guard brigades are actually located.[38] Advice
and assistance, yes; inspection and oversight, no.
How, then, should tri-component leaders sort out the mess? In what way do these generalizations point to a solution?
Perhaps the first step is to recognize that the problem stems from the way in which the components have come to
regard each other. As this essay has argued, the habit of thinking hierarchically is not only destructive but also
hardened by the forces of history and discrete institutional culture, impediments that are not easily overcome. All
parties should recognize the trap. Realistically accounting for each institution's historical pull is an absolute must.
Instead of trying to replace the pyramid, a better alternative would be to redefine its aims in such a way as to
maximize each component's strengths for the common goal of building a seamless Army. To eliminate the inclination
for hierarchical thinking, the pyramid should be reconstructed to tilt to its side.

Figure 2. A First-to-Fight Orientation.

In the new conceptualization, shown in Figure 2 above, the primary objective is "first to fight." It is an inclusive,
simple term that portrays how corporate ends can be properly related to means, intentions to capabilities, and
objectives to resources. Figure 2 shows that the tip of the spear is filled with those units designated to deploy and fight
immediately or within two months of preparation. They would be identified as the "Now + 60" or N60 team. These
units would include not only the five front-line AC divisions, but also selected high-priority RC organizations like the
USAR's Force Support Package (FSP I) or ARNG "round out" units.[39]
The second category would include selected units that can deploy soon or within a 90-day window of notification.
This team would be known as the "Soon + 90" or S90 team. The S90 team might include the five second-line AC
divisions, the two AC/ARNG divisions (which include three heavy enhanced National Guard brigades in one and three
light ones in the other), and selected FSP II USAR units.[40] The final category is the "Later + 180" or L180 team.
This team would require up to six months of preparation before being deployed. It is here, for instance, that the eight
ARNG divisions would be placed.
A complimentary "tiered resourcing" strategy should also be applied across all three forces. As an example, the N60
team would be funded to a 90- to 100-percent readiness standard, the S90 team at 80-89 percent, and the L180 group
at a 65-79 percent. "Resourcing" here would include not only money, but people and force structure as well.[41]
Emphasis must be on the front lines. Above all, forward-edge units would be filled to the greatest extent possible with

reservists on full-time or near-full-time status.[42] The USAR's "Reserve Association Support Program" (RASP)
points to a solution here. In that pilot program, selected Reserve volunteers serve on a two-year active-duty assignment
with the AC, after which they are returned to their original unit as drilling reservists.[43] While the current program is
limited to enlisted soldiers, it could easily be expanded and tailored to fit the new first-to-fight priorities.[44]
The top priority of any RASP-like program should be to place Reservists and Guardsmen on full-time or near-fulltime status for, say, two years. They should be recruited for the front-edge and then passed back to the S90 and L180
units after their tour. Such an arrangement resolves much of the civilian employment dilemmas across the Total Force.
It would also blend RC soldiers seamlessly into the first-to-fight culture. These soldiers would, in turn, be the primary
trainers for the drilling reservists of their parent organizations. Such "muddy boots" assignments, moreover, should be
tied to RC promotion criteria and rewarded accordingly. Under this scenario, it is not hard to see how the first
thousand captains, lieutenants, and privates who enter the program in the year 2000 would mature into the generals,
colonels, and sergeants major for the Total Force by 2025.
Space and intent prevent a deeper discussion of the first-to-fight conceptualization. The point here is not to prescribe a
new strategy, but to describe how a new strategy is an absolute imperative if the Army After Next is ever to become a
seamless Army by 2025. Nor is it certain that the ongoing programs designed to enhance AC/RC integration will
produce the desired results. That's all the more reason, then, to analyze and critique those programs against the
conceptual yardstick offered here. In the next section, six ongoing AC/RC integration pilot programs are analyzed
more deeply to uncover insights into the quality of the Army's transition into the 21st century.
Six Paths to Seamlessness
Of the many pilot programs launched on behalf of the seamless Army, six offer important insights on the quality of
thinking thus far. This is not to say that all six pilot programs are without flaws. Indeed, two programs, the AC/ARNG
division and the integration of ARNG infantry companies into AC battalions, may potentially send the seamless Army
to the wheelchair. Auditing the concepts as well as the programs themselves will offer important insights to determine
if intentions are properly related to capabilities. The six programs are: FORCE XXI, the Reserve Association Support
Program, the AC/ARNG division, the "Hybrid/Integrated Alternative," AC/RC commands, and the Reserve Officer
Personnel Management Act (ROPMA).
Much has been said about FORCE XXI. It remains here only to reinforce the point that "part-time" soldiers at the
front edge represent part-time priorities and short-term thinking. Such programs will neither enhance seamlessness nor
bring out the best in citizen-soldiers. Placing selected reservists on full-time or near-full-time status, as previously
discussed, not only allows the Guard and Reserve to leverage their core competencies at the front, but also propels
"competence velocity" throughout the Total Force when front-edge reservists, imbued with a front-edge culture
perspective, pass back to their home units as drilling reservists.[45] Indeed, this point cannot be overstated. Core
competencies--not force structure--will be the currency each component must possess if it is to own a place in the
Army After Next of 2025.[46] Creating "advantage opportunities" to get the most out of each component's core
competencies is also the smartest way to leverage the Total Force's "skills inventory" for the betterment of the whole.
To be sure, laws and regulations will have to be revisited, reassessed, and replaced. This will not be easy, and anyone
recommending revolutionary change cannot be naïve about the obstacles. But current political trends at least provide
an opportunity to encourage revolutionary thinking. The point to keep in mind is that a plan that places reservists on
full-time or near-full-time status for a tour at the front edge is a strategy that realistically acknowledges and properly
accounts for the inherent differences in all three Army components. By imagining a "front-edge perspective" as the
controlling idea, any push to remove existing barriers will be that much more acceptable.
Another pilot program that deserves attention is the Reserve Association Support Program, or RASP. As
conceptualized, RASP provides a direction to navigate through the various legal, political, and cultural shoals en route
to the Army After Next. But as it stands, the program is badly underfunded, underpublicized, and underfocused.
RASP is a three-year pilot program that the USAR started in March 1998. It is designed to enlist 100 non-prior-service
soldiers into USAR Tier 1A Force Support Package combat support and combat service support units. After spending
24 months on Active Duty for Training status, to include Initial Entry Training, these soldiers would be returned to

their original units of assignment as drilling reservists. But due to an anemic marketing campaign, the program has
attracted less than ten percent of the volunteers required. Part of the problem for the low turnout, too, is the small size
of the bonus that the USAR is offering, about $5000. While the AC is willing to add another $5000 from its own
account, raising the bonus to $10,000, that funding is temporary, designed only for the pilot group of 100 soldiers as a
means to prime the pump.
In truth, money thrown into RASP demonstrates how short-term urgencies to recruit have overshadowed the long-term
importance of building a seamless Army. Neither the USAR nor the AC has seen in RASP the exponential potential it
holds for the future. Even if the AC were to provide the additional funds for the full term of the program and the
USAR were to land all 100-plus soldiers and then shift those soldiers to the FORCE XXI division tomorrow, the skills
that have been targeted for the pilot program will not match the most important billets, such as combat medics, that
must be filled.[47] Nor will the incentives, which are cast in terms of dollars and cents, attract the type and quality of
soldiers the seamless Army will require for the future.[48]
A whole new way of thinking about career progression must take hold in designing a hybrid RASP. As an example,
reservists must hold the "front-edge RASP" perspective in the same high regard as the AC does the "muddy boots"
perspective. Those who have borne the greatest weight of field duty--and excelled--must be culled out for advanced
promotion, top schools, and important assignments. Old notions of reserve duty may still apply for the L180 team, but
those positions will not offer the best opportunities for promotion and advanced schooling. More and more, RC career
progression in the Total Force must be one of choice rather than chance. If this means that citizen-soldiers may have to
decide to put their civilian careers on temporary hold for two years, it will also mean that they will be able to plan and
predict their life patterns at the front edge rather than be "nickeled and dimed" by the demands of reserve duty that
always seems to extend above and beyond normal drill periods. Reservists have sarcastically termed such extra--and
unpaid--service as "love duty." A hybrid RASP offers an important tool to unscrew these problems from the system,
but only if it is imagined holistically and with a discerning eye to the future.
The third important pilot program involves the push to create the AC/ARNG division. Perhaps the severest criticism
that can be leveled against this concept is that the plan lacks sincerity. There can be few redeeming qualities in a
strategy that preaches integration while fostering antagonism. In addition to the shortcomings noted earlier, the
AC/ARNG plan suffers from the same narrow view as RASP. Why, for instance, does the division omit the USAR,
which contains most of the theater-, corps-, and division-level core competencies in combat service and combat
service support skills? Whether the oversight is deliberate or politically driven, the foregone opportunities for
instituting a seamless culture must be recognized as a top-tier failure. Conceiving the AC/ARNG division in the
closed, discrete, and distant formulation that it has at present falls far short of the potential that Guardsmen and
Reservists can achieve.
Just the opposite must happen. The first order of business is to redesignate the plan for what the future demands: an
RC/AC division. In other words, the appropriate perspective is to imagine the RC/AC division in a conceptualization
similar to the FORCE XXI division, only this time the RC is in control. The life patterns and culture of the citizensoldier, not the soldier-citizen, must prevail. The battle focus is still anchored to the first-to-fight perspective, but the
priorities for RC ownership dictate that they are held responsible for readiness. Simple math, too, makes the case better
than words can for division command: three ARNG enhanced brigades equal one ARNG major general division
commander--period.[49] All that remains is to determine who should assist the Guard division commander.
Of the two assistant division commanders, the one responsible for maneuver can be an AC officer and the one charged
with logistics can be a USAR officer. The ARNG division commander runs the division from the primary headquarters
at Ft. Riley and Ft. Carson, and his assistants direct the training and logistics operations with a fully integrated tricomponent staff, some of whom will be sited where it makes the best sense. Such a tri-component leadership structure
not only leverages the expertise and core competencies of each component, it also provides for a built-in key in the
persons of the assistant division commanders to unlock and tap the best advantages of each institution. Here, then, is
the controlling idea: the "good servant" working in tandem with the "good partner," both working for the "good
soldier," and all serving in a seamless division that is ready to deploy to war within 90 days.
The "Hybrid/Integrated Alternative" is the fourth pilot program. This is a two-phased strategy that falls under an

umbrella plan called "Support to Organizational Training, Functional Area Analysis."[50] It is designed and conceived
by the AC to improve its methods and techniques of support to RC units, but primarily to the Army National Guard's
15 enhanced separate brigades spread across the country.[51] In the Hybrid phase, just recently completed, 15
"Training Support Brigades" (TSB) were created and paired with the 15 enhanced brigades in order to provide
customized mentorship. Training Support Brigades are primarily staffed by the AC, including most of the key
headquarters leadership positions. The TSBs exist to assist their National Guard enhanced brigades in a host of
activities, like helping to prepare yearly training plans and synchronizing allocation priorities of scare resources such as
training areas and logistics support. Under the Integrated Alternative phase, to end in October 1999, "Training Support
Divisions" (TSDs) are to be created to provide administrative support to the TSBs. Where the TSBs are primarily
staffed by the Active Army, the TSDs' assets, personnel, and funds will come mainly from the USAR.
For better or worse, the Hybrid/Integrated Alternative was legislated as part of Title XI in 1994. The program was
perceived by many to be a politically driven effort to prevent a repeat of what happened to the ARNG during Desert
Storm rather than a concept to build a seamless Army for the future. It is also a terribly costly program for the AC in
terms of expert, experienced soldiers. Over 5000 billets, most of them mid-grade officers, staff sergeants, and sergeants
first class, were siphoned out of the ten already undermanned AC divisions to establish the TSBs. Moreover, like the
AC/ARNG division concept, the focus is primarily on the Guard. Rarely will there be a concerted effort to integrate
into an enhanced separate brigade's "lane training," the main collective training event, any USAR combat support or
combat service support units. Generally, USAR units conduct their "lanes" separately and under the primary
supervision of the USAR's Training Exercise Divisions.[52] Thus the potential for exploiting cross-fertilization of core
competencies during the collective phase, arguably the most important phase of any training, is marginalized by
design. It is also unclear whether the "Integrated" phase will prosper. As the main purpose of the TSD is primarily to
assist the Guard, questions about "return on investments" cannot escape Reserve planners, especially when most of the
assets--as well as the purse strings--are held by the USAR.
This is not to say, however, that the entire strategy is without merit. The TSBs will provide the Reserve Components
an important "one-stop shop" for all manner of training-related matters. The TSBs are staffed with leaders who possess
field experience as well as functional expertise. They are also starting to earn the same type of service-oriented
reputation as the Readiness Groups, the organization that the TSBs replaced. The Readiness Groups acted like a "1800-HELP" organization, pouncing on RC problems without retribution or negative reporting. The Reserve
Components will receive the same kind of user-friendly assistance from the training support brigades, which can create
"advantage opportunities" for the Guard's enhanced brigades by incorporating Reserve combat support and combat
service support units in a "seamless OPCON" arrangement. If this objective can be met, then the Hybrid Alternative
will easily deliver on all that it has promised without having to rely on the less promising Integrated Alternative.
The fifth pilot initiative is the AC/RC command plan, which falls under an umbrella strategy called multi-component
units, under which AC and RC personnel, equipment, and funding are joined in a common organization to capitalize
on resources and core competencies. Starting in fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2000, 12 such fully integrated
units will be formed.[53] By prior arrangement, the AC will command eight of the units, most of which are combat
support or combat service support, and the ARNG and USAR will command two each.[54] While there are many
issues yet to resolve, such as pay, promotion, legal matters, and funding, all three components are well aware of the
challenges and have agreed to work seriously to make this worthy plan a reality.
The problem arises when manpower-intense, combat maneuver organizations are included as part of the strategy.
While four of the 12 units mentioned above possess combat arms competencies, none are combat maneuver
organizations (infantry, armor, or cavalry). The omission was perhaps no mistake. Combat maneuver organizations,
whether in the active component or the National Guard, are the hardest of all Army branches to keep ready because of
the collective training requirements. Indeed, combat maneuver units depend less on technological superiority than on
the superiority of collective training, proof of which was made clear in the famous battle of 73 Easting during Desert
Storm. In that battle, an American cavalry troop consisting of only nine Abrams tanks, 12 Bradley armored fighting
vehicles, and 140 soldiers decimated an elite Iraqi tank brigade in 23 minutes and captured over 200 prisoners without
sustaining any casualties.[55]
Such one-sided devastation resulted from the cohesion within each tank and Bradley crew, which requires a minimum

of five weeks to practice loading, arming, firing, and maintaining its equipment. Only then can a crew load and fire its
main gun on the move, against a moving target, and almost never miss. It takes another three to four weeks to integrate
crew skills into platoons and companies so that the many can fight as one. Another three to four weeks are required to
integrate companies into battalions. Still another month must be dedicated to integrating battalion task forces into
battle-sharp brigade combat teams. In short, combat maneuver skill is a warfighting competency that can be achieved
only through relentless repetition of collective training drills. It also requires much time. This is the only way to make
difficult warfighting skills for manpower-intensive organizations like infantry and armor become second nature.[56]
Thus the heated exchanges that arose when the Army announced its intentions to replace AC infantry companies with
ARNG infantry companies came as no surprise. The proposal is to replace six AC infantry companies with ARNG
infantry companies in two selected AC brigades, one each from the Army's only two light infantry divisions, the 10th
Mountain Division in New York and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. Each brigade has three battalions, and each
battalion has three infantry companies. Under the proposal, all three battalions of the selected brigade would get a
Guard company, but only at the expense of losing an AC company. As it was announced, the proposal drew fire from
all sides, including from both AC divisions, from the Chief of the Infantry School, Major General Carl Ernst, and from
the National Guard. While fully supportive of AC/RC integration initiatives, Ernst summarized the AC's position by
noting that the "rifle company is not the place to start." The Guard, meanwhile, questioned the sense of integrating
company-sized units as opposed to battalion-sized organizations.[57]
Ironically, at almost the same time when the AC and ARNG were debating the issue, the solution was being proved in
the Mojave Desert. In perhaps one of the most stunning examples of AC/ARNG combat maneuver integration, the 1st
Squadron, 221st "Wildhorse" Cavalry of the Nevada National Guard absolutely crushed an AC brigade combat team-from an above-the-line AC division--in several head-to-head battles during a National Training Center rotation. The
drubbing was no fluke. The Nevada squadron had fought as part of the vaunted 11th Armored Cavalry "Blackhorse"
Regiment, the Army's "opposing forces" (OPFOR) at the National Training Center. How the Nevada squadron was
able to achieve such a razor-sharp warfighting edge points to a solution for integrating maneuver elements in the Army
After Next.[58] Here are four points to note.
The first point to acknowledge is that 1-221 Cavalry is a "round-out" unit, perhaps the last in the Army. This
meant that the 11th ACR did not have to pay for integration at the expense of its own combat strength. The
round-out concept is a pre-Desert Storm invention whereby AC divisions kept on hand two of the three required
AC brigades and were assigned a Guard brigade as their third or "round-out" brigade. That idea, however, was
discredited and abandoned owing to the findings that kept Guard maneuver units out of the war. But as the 1221 Cav proved, the "round-out" concept must be seriously reconsidered, at least in the context of maneuver
combat elements, if the AC's overall readiness is to be protected.
The second point is that officers from the regiment and the State of Nevada showed visionary leadership by
pooling their resources to make the integration of 1-221 Cavalry "seamless." Colonel Guy C. Swan, the
regiment's commander, initiated an innovative and deliberate training plan designed specifically to bring 1-221
Cav up to high warfighting standards. The Wildhorse squadron, led by Lieutenant Colonel Aaron R. Kenneston,
was equal to the challenge. So were the Nevada National Guard leaders, who invited the regiment to participate
in their training and readiness planning sessions. The state even purchased for 1-221 Cav the desert battle-dress
uniforms, berets, and other accouterments of the "Krasnovian" OPFOR soldier. From beginning to end, the
training campaign took two hard years to complete and culminated in the Wildhorse's hard-earned victory.
Without any formal directive, 1-221 Cav has proudly opted to wear the 11th ACR's unit patch.
The third point is that the close proximity between the two organizations eased the integration. The Nevada
squadron is located in Las Vegas, about three hours from Ft. Irwin, home of the 11th ACR. Everything from
arranging operational "ride-alongs" to "dining-ins" was made simpler because of the favorable location. Planners
will have to factor this consideration into their schemes.
The final point to recognize is that 1-221 Cav is a battalion-sized element, the lowest Army echelon to have an
assigned staff to plan for tactical, logistical, communications, and security operations. Battalion-sized
organizations are self-contained entities that can plan, fight, and sustain themselves independently if necessary.
Given the success of 1-221 Cav, it becomes clear that battalion-sized organizations--not brigades or companies-should be the chess pieces for combat maneuver "round-out" integration. This offers the best chance for
integration in terms of AC readiness while offering planners on both sides the least complicated matchup. It is in

this context that the ARNG's concerns over the current integration schemes must be heeded.
There is no question that all sides sincerely want to make a success of AC/ARNG maneuver combat command
integration. It is no longer a matter of gaining or losing prestige, but rather one of necessity. The question thus far has
been how. As it is currently conceived, no one is happy--and for good reason. The real question should be why. Why
impale the seamless Army with such a blunt idea when a workable solution has already proven itself under the
toughest of conditions at the NTC? It was probably a good thing that the "blue force" brigade combat team did not
realize it was being devastated by an Army National Guard squadron. The soldiers' pride might have been too hurt for
them to learn from the experience. It would not be wise for everyone else to miss the lesson.
The final pilot initiative is the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act, or ROPMA. Of all the programs
discussed here, this is the most important. How well the Guard and Reserve will be able to fight and win by the year
2025 will in large measure be determined by how each values the quality of its force. How and why it selects,
nominates, and promotes its soldiers, NCOs, and officers and sends them to the best schools can be answered only
after the Reserve Components first determine what a successful career path is. Some examples have already been
offered in the text and notes of this essay, but they only scratch the surface. Even granting the improvements that
ROPMA engendered, the standards, stipulations, and decisions for promotion in the Guard and Reserve, whose
members both come before the same board, are deeply parochial and uneven.
No one should be in rush to advocate a system that mirrors exactly that of the AC. The reserves are different. They
each operate under different institutional stipulations, such a deciding if an AGR (full-time Guardsman or Reservist)
or drilling reservist (part-timer) should command a given reserve unit. Both must deal with geographic boundaries that
divide their force structures into independent parts which are difficult to mesh into one central system. Thus a drilling
Guardsman in one state cannot serve in a higher position of a sister unit in another state, even if that unit is just a few
miles across the border. To climb up the ranks, some officers have changed career fields as an expedient to get
promoted, even if they hold no expertise in the new career field. The pre-ROPMA system either supported such moves
or had no patent method to see through the charade.
All that can be said at this point is that the new ROPMA laws should not be taken as a lasting change. They are only
the beginning. The entire system must be thoroughly reexamined, with its various component pieces broken down and
analyzed to determine how each piece fits to the other. It must also reflect the new imperatives of the 21st century,
above all the "first to fight" perspective. Parochial agendas must be eliminated and replaced by a performance-oriented
career pattern. The AC must also recognize its part in crafting a new RC career system for the 21st century. In many
ways, the AC has been party to the "dumbing down" of the Guard and Reserve. For instance, in the 1998 class at the
Command and General Staff College, a crucial year-long school for junior field-grade officers, only 64 slots out of
more than 1050 were afforded to the Guard and Reserve, each of which received 32 slots apiece. But of that, only ten
slots, five each to the Guard and Reserve, were earmarked for the full term. The other RC attendees were forced to
depart midway through the training. Compare that figure to the 128 officers from the other services or the 90
international officers who attend for the full term. Moreover, in the college's most prestigious course, the School of
Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), which offers a second year of specialized study, no slots are allocated to the
Reserve Components.[59]
Thus the new RC career system must be seen as a joint responsibility of all three components. Above all, the hybrid
system must identify and define what a successful career looks like. Whatever that standard is, it must be commonly
held and well understood by the Guard and Reserve. The sum total of an upgraded, standard career system will breed
top-quality officers, NCOs, and soldiers that will sustain the Total Army of 2025.[60]
The Covenant
Thinking anew to prepare for an uncertain future is in keeping with the best of Army traditions. The challenges of the
new millennium are plentiful enough to keep everyone who cares alive to the possibilities. Thankfully, senior political
and military leaders are beginning to speak openly about the real damage to readiness that a complacent polity has
caused. But as serious as these problems are, the Army has faced such problems before. Few can forget the Army's
sorry shape after the Vietnam War. The leaders who turned that Army around were rightfully rewarded in Desert

Storm for their vision and fortitude. But that turnaround must be understood as occurring within the context of the
Cold War. Things were clearer then, if no less difficult. For the most part, too, those leaders have retired into civilian
life.
The way is therefore clear for a new breed of leaders with new ideas for a new world ahead. There is every
opportunity for this new leadership to represent all three components and be joined in one common purpose. All the
tools are on hand to help build a seamless Army: the Army Warfighter Experiment Project (AWE), Joint Vision 2010,
and the Army After Next Project. To be sure, Army leaders have spared no expense to mark a sound path, even if
sometimes imperfectly or with a questionable return on investment.[61] The desire and will are present. But the single
most important element is missing: trust. Without trust, the seamless Army will always remain an elusive idea. There
is abundant "relevant power" in the Army family to build the seamless Army of the 21st century if all three
components trust each other enough to share it. There is an equally fruitful chance for all three components to achieve
"relevant readiness" if all are willing to trust in a new way of conceiving their partnership. In this sense, the routes
from the Army of Excellence to the Army After Next are just as clear as those from Vietnam to Desert Storm. But as
Sociologist Stephen Covey has warned, trust must be earned, not captured. This, too, can be in hand once all three
components are trustworthy to the others and to the covenant of one seamless Army.
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